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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE POLICE: A POLICE VIEWPOINT
VINCENT L. BRODERICK*
Tim POLICE FUNCTION IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
Basic to this discussion is a consideration of the
function of the police department in our society.
It maintains law and social order, certainly. But
the maintenance of law and social order is not an
end in itself. It is a means by which it becomes
possible for each of us, as individuals, to enjoy the
individual liberties which are ours not only by constitutional mandate, but as children of God. A
climate of law and social order is necessary if each
of us is to live and study and work in peace. It is
necessary to prevent the exercise of liberty by some
-liberty gone haywire-to infringe upon the liberties of others. Ours is not a perfect society, and the
very existence of liberty, particularly in our large
urban complexes, depends upon the maintenance,
by a vigorous, alert, competent police force, of a
climate which will sustain it.
To do this job effectively, a police force, through
each of its members, must be alert to the scope and
nature of its responsibilities. The police officer is
the servant of the public. His shield, his gun, his
authority have been given to him in trust. He must
be aware of his obligation to respect the individual
human dignity of each member of the public. He
has a right to expect such respect himself. He must
understand the problems of the community he
serves; he must have an awareness of the vexations,
the frustrations, the deprivations which beset its
citizens. He must perform his function fairly and
impartially, without reference to the race, the
national origin or the religious beliefs of the people
whom he serves. If he has prejudices, he must be
trained so to do his job that his prejudices do not
influence his official actions. Above all, he must
constantly remember that the ultimate end of the
police function is not only the maintenance of a
climate of law and social order, but also the exercise of liberty by every citizen within that climate.
When a police officer is authorized to take restrictive action, it is for the purpose of protecting
society-of protecting the liberties of all-from the
license of the few. And his authority to take re* Former Commissioner of Police, New York City;
and former Chief Assistant United States Attorney for
the Southern District of New York.

strictive action goes no further than the wayward
activities of the few require.
In our society we have always been jealous of
any attempt to restrict liberty. Police officers must
recognize, and indeed should share in, this jealousy.
THE PROBLEM OF CRn

We in law enforcement, and many others throughout the land, are greatly concerned with a rising
pattern of violent crime--crime which has grown at
a rate far greater than that of our population. Some
of this rise in crime is statistical, and is attributable
to more comprehensive crime reporting; some also
may be attributable to the presence of more police
on the streets. It is possible that some portion of
the rise has been occasioned by the fact that our
youthful population has become proportionately
larger than formerly.
A major contributing factor to the rise in crime
has been the development in our urban centers of
pockets of poverty and discrimination, where vast
numbers of people are crowded together in ghetto
areas, deprived of their individuality, bereft of their
dignity, inadequately educated, ill-housed, with
few employment opportunities, no future, no hope.
Violent crime in our society cannot be prevented
by the efforts of municipal law enforcement alone.
Since much of this crime stems from social and
economic ills, those social and economic ills must
be cured if a crime prevention program is to be
successful. Improved police patrol can prevent
much of the violent crime which occurs on the
streets. It cannot reach those crimes of violenceand this includes the great volume of such crimeswhich take place off the street, in family contexts
or between acquaintances.
For too long our society has sought the solution
for its crime problem exclusively in the area of improving and expanding its police services. Certainly we should seek constantly to improve our
police services: it does seem to me that in expanding indefinitely our police forces we shall serve
no useful purpose. The law of diminishing returns
will come into play; the point of no further returns
will soon be reached; and the problems stemming
from the disorientation of a substantial portion of
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our population, with no stake in our society, will
still be with us.
In the anti-crime effort a major commitment
must be made-a commitment far beyond any that
has been made to date-in the socio-economic field.
Active pursuit of pervasive anti-poverty programs,
embracing adequate housing, broad social services,
comprehensive educational and employment training, and the expansion of employment opportunities
is required to provide a broad attack on major root
causes of crime-an attack which the police themselves are powerless to mount.
Recognition of the relatively limited nature of
municipal law enforcement's role in the total crime
picture provides, in my judgment, a necessary perspective for consideration of the effect of recent
Supreme Court decisions upon crime prevention.
"Unshackling" the police, if they have indeed been
"shackled", will not begin to solve the problem.
T1m SUiRM

COURT AND THE

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

The Supreme Court has articulated, in recent
years and in various contexts, its concern for the
rights of the individual when confronted with lawful authority. It has been suggested, by many concerned with the rise in crime, that the Court does
not manifest a comparable concern for the corporate community-for the due administration of
justice.
The Court's concern for the individual has manifested itself in, among other things, the extension
to local law enforcement of the exclusionary rules
with respect to unauthorized search and seizure
(Mapp v. Ohio'); the extension to the states of the
principle that an accused is entitled to counsel
(Gideon v. Wainwrigt2); and a suggestion that the
right to counsel extends to pre-judicial proceedings
(Escobedo v. llilois3).
I do not read into the Supreme Court's very real
concern for the rights of individuals a lack of concern for the due administration of justice. The
Court has, in certain of its opinions within the past
year, graphically demonstrated its concern for the
administration of justice. We in law enforcement
must take note of that concern. For instance,
in Linkletter v. Walker4 and Angelet v. Fay5, the
Supreme Court had before it the question of
whether or not Mapp should be retrospectively
1367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
4 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
5381 U.S. 654 (1965).
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applied-a question left open in the Mapp decision.
Griffin v. California6, in which the Supreme Court
held that comment by a trial court and prosecutor
upon a defendant's failure to take the stand violated his constitutional rights and impelled reversal,
also left open the question of retrospective application, and this question was before the Court earlier
this year in Tehan v. SlottY
The Court decided that both Mapp and Griffin v.
California should be applied only prospectivelyin both cases largely because of the adverse impact
which contrary decisions would have on the due
administration of justice.
Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for the majority in
Linkletter, noted that Wolf v. Colorado8, in 1949,
had put the states on notice that the fourth amendment applied to state searches and seizures. It also
put them on notice that the Supreme Court looked
to the states to provide adequate procedures to
implement the application of the fourth amendment to state processes. When the states did not, in
the Court's view, respond, it extended, through
Mapp, the exclusionary rule to the states. Mr.
Justice Clark pointed out that in determining
whether or not Mapp should have retrospective
application, the Court considered the purposes of
the rule, and the effect upon the administration of
justice:
In rejecting the Wolf doctrine as to the exclusionary rule the purpose was to deter the
lawless action of the police and to effectively
enforce the Fourth Amendment. That purpose
will not at this late date be served by the
wholesale release of the guilty victims.
Finally, there are interests in the administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial
process to consider. To make the rule of Mapp
retrospective would tax the administration of
justice to the utmost. Hearings would have to
be held on the excludability of evidence long
since destroyed, misplaced or deteriorated.
If it is excluded, the witnesses available at the
time of the original trial will not be available
or if located their memory will be dimmed.
To thus legitimate such an extraordinary procedural weapon that has no bearing on guilt
would seriously disrupt the administration of
justice.9
' 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
7 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
8338 U.S. 25 (1949).
9 381 U.S. 618, 637-38 (1965). In the course of the
argument before the Court in Linkleter, Mr. justice
Harlan requested counsel for the National District Attorneys' Association, which appeared as amicus curiae,
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Mr. Justice Clark noted that in those areas
where newly enunciated constitutional principles
had been applied retrospectively 10 , "the principle
that we applied went to the fairness of the trialthe very integrity of the fact-finding process.
Here... the fairness of the trial is not under attack.
All that petitioner attacks is the admissibility of
evidence, the reliability and relevancy of which is
not questioned, and which may well have had no
1
effect on the outcome." '
In Tehan v. Sholt, which arose in the context of
the Ohio Blue Sky Laws, the Court considered a
statement by the Attorney General of California
that retroactive application of Griffin v. California
would free thousands of prisoners, and it refused so
to apply it:
Empirical statistics are not available, but
experience suggests that California is not indulging in hyperbole when in its amicis curiae
brief in this case it tells us that 'Prior to this
Court's decision in Griffin, literally thousands
of cases were tried in California in which comment was made upon the failure of the accused
to take the stand. Those reaping the greatest
benefit from a rule compelling retroactive
application of Griffin would be [those] under
lengthy sentences imposed many years before
Griffin. Their cases would offer the least likelihood of a successful retrial, since in many, if
not most, instances, witnesses and evidence
are no longer available. There is nothing to
suggest that what would be true in California
would not also be true in Connecticut, Iowa,
New Jersey, New Mexico, and Ohio. To require all of those States now to void the conviction of every person who did not testify at
his trial would have an impact upon the administration of their criminal law so devastat12
ing as to need no elaboration.
The Supreme Court has been criticized for
leaving open the questions of retrospective application of the principles enunciated in such cases as
Mapp and Griffin v. California.But the very purto submit information as to the number of pre-Mapp
cases in which New York State defendants were executed, after trials at which evidence was elicited that
might have been affected by the Mapp decision.
10Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) has
been retrospectively applied (Doughty v. Maxwell, 376
U.S. 202 (1964)). Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board,
357 U.S. 214 (1958), retrospectively applied the principle of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (State required to furnish transcripts of trial to indigents on appeal).
11381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965).
382 U.S. 406, 418-19 (1966).

pose of leaving such questions open has been to
provide an opportunity for an informed body of
opinion to develop, for empirical data to be collected, and for the full consequences of resolution
in either direction to be analyzed. Speaking for a
majority of the Second Circuit en banc in Angelet v.
Fay, 3 with respect to the question of the retroactivity of Mapp, Judge Harold R. Medina suggested that it was reasonable "to assume that the
Court was fully aware of the difficulty of the question and preferred to decide it only after there had
been an interval in which courts and legal scholars
might have ample time to weigh the pros and cons".
What lesson do we draw from the approach of
the Court in Linkletter and in Tehan v. Shott? We
learn that the Supreme Court is determined that
the rights of the individual will be protected, but it
wishes to mandate that protection without jeopardizing the public weal and the due administration of justice. It recognizes, in short, that the
Constitution is intended not only to protect individual rights but also to protect the rights of society.

MAPP ANm ESCODEDO
Mapp and Escobedo have been upsetting decision
so far as the immediate problems of municipal law
enforcement are concerned, but for very different
reasons.
Mapp prescribes, for application to the states, a
"simple" method of enforcing the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures: exclusion. Exclusion is a disciplinary device. It has been characterized by Judge Learned
Hand in another context as "the only practical
way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. 14
The Mapp decision has without question complicated the law enforcement function. It has required that police officers be educated as to the
requirements of the law of search and seizure. In
New York City, for example, in 1960, the year
prior to the Mapp decision, no more than a handful
of search warrants were obtained by the New York
City Police Department. Last year many thousands
were obtained. New York State has long had search
and seizure requirements on a state level comparable to those of the fourth amendment, but failure
to comply with those rules had not rendered inadmissible evidence obtained after an illegal
search 5, and hence, as a practical matter, few
search warrants were sought.
13 333 F 2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1964).
14United States v. Pugliese, 153 F 2d 497, 499 (2d
Cir. 1945).
1 Cf People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585
(1926).
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The more difficult educational problem has entailed the matter of permissible action on the street
without a warrant; in other words what constitutes probable cause to make an arrest (and
an incidental search) without a warrant. And the
educational problem has been complicated by the
absence of generally accepted ground rules.
Administrators in local law enforcement have
moved consistently, in recent years, toward professionalization of the police function: toward recruiting the most able men, toward improving the
initial and in-service training given to police officers.
Great progress has been made, particularly in
many of the larger cities. But the stark fact will
always remain that the municipal police officer is
called upon to take action alone, on the street, in
the face of violently developing situations, without
law books, without ready authorities, without legal
advice, and quite often in an atmosphere of latent
or overt hostility, in which his own life, and that of
others, may be in danger. And in such a climate
he is called upon to make decisive value judgments
which ultimately may prove perplexing for scholars
of the law who will consider them in the solitude of
an office or in the relative tranquillity of a court
of law. Should the criminal go free because the constable has blundered here? 16
Is there not merit in seeking to develop some
more flexible standards for enforcing the constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable search and
seizure which do not require exclusion in the case
of non-venal error? And is there not room for more
flexibility in the determination of reasonableness in
search and seizure on the street, in light of the conditions surrounding a particular incident? The
exclusionary approach to unreasonable search and
seizure cases has been developed in the context of
federal law enforcement. Mapp has resulted in the
application of that approach, without modification, to cases arising in municipal law enforcement.
Too little attention has been paid, in my judgment,
to the markedly different nature of the local law
enforcement officer's responsibilities.
A local law enforcement agency is charged not
only with the investigation and detection of crime;
in addition, it has a responsibility not borne by the
federal law enforcement agencies-that of maintaining public order. 17 The municipal police officer
has the imperative of taking immediate action to
16 See People v. Defore, supra at 21.
17This point is brought out by Judge Henry J.
Friendly in The Bill of Rights as a Code of CriminalProcedure, 53 CAL. L. REv. 929.
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prevent breaches of the peace; he must react to
developing crisis. This preventive responsibility is
in addition to the responsibility for investigating
crime which has already occurred, and calls, in my
judgment, for the application of different criteria,
and perhaps more flexible criteria, in evaluating the
propriety of action taken. Yet in no federal case
that I recall has this difference been noted, or been
a factor in decision.16
Mapp is the law. It will continue to be the law.
It was, in my judgment, a proper decision on its
facts, and I would not change it. We in police work
have learned to live with it. In time local judges
will learn what it means and what it does not mean.
In time, I hope, we will have developed principles
on a local level which will make it possible for
municipal law enforcement officers to cope with
municipal problems, observing the substance and
the spirit of the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable search and seizure, without being
bound, in the maintenance of public order, by all
of the precedents developed in the very different
context of federal investigative law enforcement.
Escobedo, too, is the law, and we must learn to
live with it. It has complicated the local law enforcement function not so much because of what
it holds, but because of what it may portend.
It holds that on the facts presented (a defendant
in custody, a lawyer present who wanted to see his
client and a client who wanted to see his lawyer,
a police refusal to permit that consultation) a
statement obtained from the defendant was not
usable as evidence.
Escobedo may portend that the right to counsel
extends to the first stage of incarceration at the
station house; that police officers before taking a
statement must warn a defendant that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement may be
used against him, and that he has a right to counsel; and that no statement may be taken from a
suspect once police activity with respect to a crime
has passed from the investigatory to the accusatory
stage-when, in short, a possible witness has become a possible defendant. It may also portend that
no statement at all may be taken after arrest.
On the facts I do not question that Escobedo was
correctly decided. I have great trouble with some
18 While federal interpretations have long been applied to problems arising from municipal law enforcement in the District of Columbia, the distinction between the law enforcement responsibilities of federal
agencies and those of the municipal police authorities
has not been considered in the cases.
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of the language in the opinion, and the implications
of that language. Thus the suggestion by Mr.
justice Goldberg that police officers investigate
rather than interrogate (not, I think, an unfair
paraphrase of what he said) implies that investigation and interrogation are separate functions, and
misses the point that interrogation is an integral
part of most municipal investigations.
Escobedo by its language has raised spectres for
the future. Does it portend what I have suggested
it may portend, or does it not? What guidelines do
law enforcement officials presently have with respect to future interrogation of those suspected of
crime? May suspects be questioned? Must they be
warned? If so, what warnings must they be given?
Must they be informed of their right to counsel? If
so, at what stage?
Thus, for two related reasons, the .Escobedo decision troubles municipal law enforcement officials:
first, because it seems to pose a threat to police interrogation as an investigative technique; second,
because it offers no guidelines for the future, save
for the unlikely situation that the fact pattern of
I
Escobedo may recur.
THE LACK OF GUIDELINES AS AN INVITATION TO
CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERAT1ON
The Supreme Court has often been criticized for
the open-ended nature of many of its decisions.
Must we in law enforcement guess what the
Supreme Court will do next? Specifically, must the
detective investigating a murder, or a kidnapping,
or a rape, tailor his investigation, or his interrogation of suspects, to his interpretation of the direction which the Supreme Court will take in the next
"hard case" presented to it?
On the other hand, can we expect the Supreme
Court to develop for us a revised code of criminal
procedure? 19 Is it the function of the Supreme
Court to lay out the ground rules, to devise the
procedures, to define the prohibitions? Is it not
rather our function to react affirmatively when the
Court has said, in effect: "Here you overstepped
the bounds?"
The lack of definitive guidelines for the future is
troublesome to law enforcement officers. Yet this
open-endedness in Supreme Court decisions, beyond the specific problem before the Court, can be
interpreted as an invitation to the public, to the
commentators, to the experts, to develop data and
statistical information, to point up problems, and
to develop a constructive approach.
19Friendly, supra note 17.

We should, in my judgment, so interpret the lack
of definition in Escobedo. We in law enforcement
are fortunate indeed that the Supreme Court has
not yet supplied it; that we have not been foredosed by too precise a definition in the Escobedo
opinion itself.
We know that there must be a more precise definition of standards of interrogation in the wake of
Escobedo. And we know that implementation of
some of the portents which may be found in the
Escobedo language will imperil effective law enforcement. I think we have received an undisguised
invitation to present the problems we see, to
develop them, and to marshal facts and data which
will support our position. It has been an invitation,
however, to present problems, facts, and data; not
polemics.
Part of the Mapp doctrine-that the fourth
amendment applied to the states-had been dear
since Wolf v. Colorado.If, between Wolf in 1949 and
Mapp in 1961, the statecourts andlegislatures, and
municipal law enforcement, had taken effective
action to make fourth amendment rights available
to defendants, the Mapp decision might never have
been forthcoming and the exclusionary rule might
never have received a constitutional encrustation in
the state search and seizure context.
Mapp is law, and Escobedo is law: we must, and
we should, accept them both. More than that, we
in law enforcement should accept enthusiatically
the principle which underlies both cases-that
American democracy places a high premium on
individual human rights, and individual human
liberty. Then we should play a creative role in determining how the principles of those cases can be
intelligently incorporated into effective municipal
law enforcement.
POLEMICS OR DIALOGUE?
One of the problems with the national discussion
of the impact of recent Supreme Court decisions
has been that we have engaged in polemics and not
in dialogue. Condemnation of the Supreme Court
for "shackling the police" rolls trippingly off the
tongue, but it accomplishes little. Charges that the
police seek to protect their "right" to violate individual liberties are scarcely more constructive.
And yet, perforce, and very quietly, much constructive work is underway. Thus the American
Law Institute is in the course of preparing a model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, which entails
a re-evaluation of the rights accorded those suspected of crime. Various other commissions, committees, and groups are studying the role of in-
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custody questioning
in crime detection and law
0
enforcement.2

The Supreme Court must be very much aware of
the work being done by the American Law Institute and the other groups, and it will undoubtedly
pay close attention to the progress of those pro2
jects. 1
In England the so-called "Judges' Rules" require
that arrested persons be warned of their rights before statements are taken from them. These rules,
we are told, work very well, and appellate activity
predicated upon improperly admitted confessions
is rare indeed. One reason for this, undoubtedly, is
that the trial court has a great deal of flexibility in
the application of the rules to particular cases.
Another very important reason is that the appellate
courts have confidence in the police, in the prosecutors, and in the lower courts.
I suspect that one reason for the tremendous
Supreme Court activity in recent years in the area
of police and court procedures is that the Supreme
Court does not have a comparable confidence in
the police, in the prosecutors, or in the lower courts.
In fact, there is to be discerned, in some Supreme
Court decisions, a fundamental distrust of police
and police methods that is generalized beyond the
facts of the particular case and the police officers
there involved. Mr. Justice White, dissenting in
Escobedo, underlined the presence of this suspicion:
This new American judges' rule, which is to
be applied in both federal and state courts, is
perhaps thought to be a necessary safegard
2 Among them, the National Crime Commission, the
District of Columbia Crime Commission, and the
American Bar Association's Project on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice. The Reporters for the
American Law Institute are James Vorenberg, director
of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Criminal Justice, and Paul M. Bator of Harvard Law
School. On the Advisory Committee of the ALI are,
among many others, David Acheson, Special Assistant
for Enforcement to the Secretary of the Treasury;
Richard G. Denzer, formerly in the New York District
Attorney's Office, who served as Counsel to the New
York Temporary Commission on Revision of Penal
Law; Chief Judge J. Edward Lumbard and Judge Henry
J. Friendly of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit; District Attorney Frank S. Hogan of New York
County; Michael J. Murphy and Howard R. Leary,
former and present Police Commissioners of New York
City; and Herman Goldstein, professor at Wisconsin
University and formerly assistant Superintendant of the
Chicago Police Department.
"1Since this paper was delivered, the Supreme Court
has rendered its opinion in the five confession cases.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 86 Sup. Ct. 1602 (1966) and
Johnson v. New Jersey, 86 Sup. Ct. 1772 (1966). The
prediction contained in the text of this paper does not
seem to have been borne out by the Miranda opinion.
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against the possibility of extorted confessions.
To this extent it reflects a deep-seated distrust
of law enforcement officers everywhere, unsupported by relevant data or current material
based on our own experience ... 22
It would be bootless, today, to attempt to assess
the reason for this suspicion, or, indeed, to argue
that none of it is justified. It does exist, and it may
explain the Court's readiness to turn to exclusionary remedies when violations of rights are
found.
We in law enforcement are fortunate, in my
judgment, that through the American Law Institute, the National Crime Commission, and the
Special Committee of the American Bar Association on Minimum Standards for the Administration
of Criminal Justice, persons outside the law
enforcement spectrum have become interested in
police matters, in police techniques, and in the
nature of the law enforcement process on a municipal level. They bring to their work a concern for
individual liberties and a concern for the administration of justice. They will have great influence,
in my judgment, not only upon the Supreme Court
and inferior courts, but also-and this is significant-upon state legislatures.
We in law enforcement should familiarize ourselves with the work of these groups. We should
offer our assistance, and we should participate actix ely with them in the development of their programs. We should delineate the problems we see in
various proposals which they have under consideration. We should conduct experiments, pilot projects
and research to test the feasibility of those
proposals. We should be free with proposals of our
own, and we should back up those proposals with
data and statistics.
If we do not constructively participate in the
work of these groups, we can blame only ourselves
if the end product they develop, and upon which
we may expect the Supreme Court, state courts
and state legislatures to rely, provides unworkable
guidelines.

Tim

DRAFTr MODEL CODE

op

PRE-ARAIGNMENT

PROCEDURE
The American Law Institute's proposed Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure (Tentative
DraftNo. 1) is in certain ways a startling document.
It is must reading for anyone concerned with the
administration of justice on a local level. It is
" 378 U.S. 478, 498 (1964).
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startling because of its recognition of the right and
obligation of police to inquire, even in the absence
of reported crime; and because of its recognition of
the need for police to interrogate,even after arrest.
It is startling, also, because of its specification of a
duty to warn arrested persons of certain rights, and
because of its specification that the interrogation of
prisoners be circumscribed in time, and that a
sound recording be taken of the interrogation
process.
A close look at some of the salient features of this
draft Model Code is in order.
The draft sets forth a fairly comprehensive statutory pattern for relationships between police and
suspected persons prior to arraignment. Among
other provisions, it authorizes law enforcement officers to seek the voluntary cooperation of persons in
furnishing information in connection with the investigation or prevention of crime, although the
cooperation may not be compelled. It must be
made clear to such persons that they have no legal
obligation to respond. If the questioning takes
place in a station house the person questioned must
be informed that he may communicate with his
counsel or others, and that they may have access to
him.
The proposed Model Code also authorizes a
police officer, if he has reasonable cause to believe
that a crime has been committed, or, if he finds
suspicious people in suspicious circumstances, to
order persons in the vicinity to remain at the scene
for no longer than 20 minutes. It also authorizes
him to use force, but not deadly force, to detain
such persons and to search them for deadly
weapons.
With respect to arrest without a warrant, the
Code contains the usual authority to arrest if the
officer has reasonable cause to believe a felony, or a
misdemeanor in his presence, has been committed.
It also authorizes arrest for a misdemeanor not
committed in his presence if the police officer believes the suspect will not otherwise be apprehended, or may cause injury to persons or damage
to property. In determining whether or not there is
reasonable cause, the officer may draw upon his
own expert knowledge, and he may rely upon information from any informant whom it is reasonable to credit, whether or not he knows him.
When a police officer arrests a person he must,
under the proposed Code, identify himself; he must
notify the person that he is under arrest, and of the
basis for the arrest. He must warn the person that

he is not obliged to answer any questions; that any
statement may be used in evidence; and that when
he reaches the station house he may communicate
with counsel, relatives, or friends.
At the station house the prisoner must be given
a similar warning by the desk officer which must be
sound recorded, and he must be given a printed
form with the same warning thereon. Information
as to his presence at the station house must immediately be given to a central facility, available by
telephone to the public, so that his counsel,
relatives or friends can immediately locate him.
A person arrested pursuant to a warrant may not
be detained at the station house and may not be
questioned, except in the presence of or with the
consent of counsel.
A person arrested without a warrant may be
detained for a period of up to four hours of preliminary screening. He may be detained for a
further period if he has counsel, and counsel consents. For certain specified crimes, the prisoner
may be detained for longer than the four-hour
period; the additional period authorized varies according to the time he was first brought to the
station house:
If brought in between midnight and 8 a. in.,
detention permissible until 4 p. in.; if between
8 a. m. and 2 p. in., detention permissible until
10 p. in.; if between 2 p. m. and midnight, until
12 noon.
Once the authorized detention period is over, the
prisoner must be released if no complaint has been
issued, although if reasonable cause exists he may
be issued a citation. Once the complaint does issue
the prisoner must be brought before a magistrate
without delay.
During the period of detention the prisoner may
be questioned, fingerprinted, photographed, placed
in a lineup or identified in some other way, and
confronted with the victim, a witness, an accomplice, or evidence.
If the prisoner is interrogated during the period
of detention, a sound recording must be made if
the interrogation extends beyond a few questions,
and a copy of the recording must be made available
to the prisoner or counsel. No questions may be
asked of the prisoner after a complaint issues, unless he is represented by counsel.
The Draft Code requires that counsel have
prompt access to the arrested person, and that the
prisoner be given reasonable opportunities, from
time to time, to consult with counsel or friends.
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It should be clear from the foregoing selective
summary that the ALI's Draft Model Code articulates requirements which will greatly circumscribe post-arrest inquiry by law enforcement. It
requires warnings which have not previously been
required, and it imposes requirements which will be
difficult and perhaps expensive to administer.
The Code demonstrates, at the same time, an
awareness of the problems faced by law enforcement, and it represents a thoughtful and conscientious effort to strike a balance between the rights
of the citizen and the needs of society for effective
criminal investigation. It warrants careful scrutiny
by all of us. And those of us in law enforcement
should regard it as a constructive first step away
from a collision course.
PROBLEms RAISED BY THE MODEL CODE

Obviously this Model Code raises many problems: Will a suspect answer questions if he is informed of his right to remain silent? Will advice
concerning the right to counsel negate further
efforts at interrogation? We are told that such
warnings present no problem for federal law enforcement officers, but, as has already been noted,
federal agents do not engage in the same type of
law enforcement functions as do municipal police
officers. Nor, in fact, do they usually deal with the
same type of crime-with murder, rape, robbery,
assault-the crimes of violence which violate the
social order of the municipality.
Will sound recording of an interrogation deter
response? Do we really know? Are the time periods
allotted for inquiry on the street sufficient in fact
to provide effective inquiry and verification? Are
the time periods allotted for post-arrest inquiry
and interrogation sufficient?
There are many other questions which the Model
Code Draft raises. I have no answers. I do not believe anyone has the answers at the present time.n
THE PILOT PROJEcr APPROACH
A few years ago the Vera Foundation, after
studying bail practices in New York courts, sug231 understand that the New York State Police presently warn prisoners of their right to remain silent and
their right to counsel. The New York State Police have
a function in many ways more akin to federal than to
municipal law enforcement agencies, and hence may
not provide a useful experience pattern. A few municipal
law enforcement agencies give similar warnings to their
prisoners prior to interrogation, but I do not know of
any study with respect to the effect of these procedures.
Nor do I know of any study which develops the manner
in which warnings, on a state or federal basis, are given.
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gested a pilot project of releasing prisoners charged
with certain offenses without bail, after preliminary
checks from which it could be determined that, in
effect, the prisoners would probably return to
answer the charges against them. The Manhattan
Bail Project was instituted in New York, and it has
been a rousing success.
A related pilot project was instituted in certain
New York precinct station houses. Vera Foundation personnel were posted in these station houses.
They briefly questioned arrested persons charged
with certain crimes, made telephone verification of
the information received, and in appropriate cases
recommended to the desk officer, who could exercise a veto power, that summonses be served in lieu
of arrest. This project, too, has been successful, and
is in the process of being expanded, with police
rather than Vera Foundation personnel handling
the telephone verification.
The Manhattan Bail Project and the Manhattan
Summons Project have made distinct contributions to the administration of justice. The Bail
Project directly attacked the problem of discrimination among arrested persons on the basis of
relative means; i.e., the more affluent prisoner
posting bail while his impoverished brother remained in jail. The Summons Project met this
problem and also relieved the police officer of the
non-productive burden, in terms of effective law
enforcement, of accompanying his prisoner to
court.
The significant factor about these projects is that
they have, through simple and limited, although
thorough, experiment, laid the groundwork for a
constructive revolution in bail and detention practices throughout the country.
Why should this pilot project technique not be
applied to problems raised by Escobedo, and in the
aftermath of Mapp? "hy should we not test, in our
various police departments throughout the country,
the proposals advanced in the Model Code draft?
If we test these on a pilot project basis we can
choose our area-a precinct, division, etc.--so that
there is a comparable control area which can be
used as a basis for comparison.
Cooperation of this sort, on a pilot project basis,
can only be productive, whatever the results. Confining the scope of the project will minimize expense.
If it is found, for example, that compliance with the
Model Code requirements with respect to postarrest warning, inquiry, access and arraignment
procedures does not impede law enforcement ac-
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tivity, this will be of interest to the American Law
Institute in its ultimate adoption of a model code,
and to legislatures which consider its adaptation
within the several states. If, on the other hand, it is
determined, on a documented basis, that adherence
to the Model Code formulae impedes effective law
enforcement, the nature and extent of the impediment can also be determined, and this too will be
of interest to the American Law institute in considering modification or adjustment of its formulae.
What I am suggesting, in brief, is that the time
has come for law enforcement to play a creative
role, a role which the Supreme Court cannot, and
should not, play. Isn't the Supreme Court, after all,
in the nature of a referee who has blown the whistle
and said: "That play violates the rules?" The
charting of the next play is not for it unless law
enforcement and the states fail to heed its warning.
It is proper no longer, even if it were ever proper,
for us in law enforcement to bemoan the fact that
the whistle was blown. The whistle should be blown
when individual rights are violated. Nor should we
bewail the lack of guidelines for the future; instead,
we should participate to the full in charting meaningful guidelines.
TnE DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURAL
GUIDELINES

What we should realize, in fact, is that we should
seek and encourage legislative rather than judicial
solutions to our problems. The Model Code of the
American Law Institute points in that direction.
Thus the constitutional imperative, as derived
from Wolf and made binding by Mapp, is that
there must be no unreasonable searches and seizures
by the State. Is it not then for the State to delineate
by statute those searches and seizures which are
reasonable? The constitutional imperative to be
derived from .Escobedois less dear and more ambiguous. Is it not for the state to clarify the area by
definitive legislation?
I do not suggest that we seek state legislation in
the areas of search and seizure or post-arrest interrogation which will thwart the Supreme Court. I
suggest, as Judge Friendly has previously suggested,n that the Bill of Rights is not a code of
criminal procedure, and that a legislature rather
than the Court is the appropriate body to which to
turn for procedural direction. When legislation is
sought, the predicate for that legislation is a body
of facts, and the body of facts germane to law en21See Friendly, supra note 17.

forcement problems can best be developed by those
in law enforcement. And if, for example, a legislative procedural blueprint is developed for postarrest interrogation, underlying the legislation will
be legislative findings, based upon empirical data,
as to the reasons why the legislation is necessary. I
would expect that if there were a challenge to the
admissibility of a confession taken in conformity
with that legislation, the basic question for the
Court would concern whether the legislation was
reasonable, and it would have access to the legislative findings in making this determination.
PosT-AdmusT INQuiRY
The tentative draft of the ALI Model Code
limits the period during which post-arrest inquiry
can be made, and it delineates carefully the circumstances under which it can be made, but it does not
proscribe it. The draft, and the commentary contained therein, indicate that the draftsmen have
been at least tentatively convinced of the necessity
to permit law enforcement officers some freedom to
inquire after arrest.
While, as I have noted earlier, the Supreme
Court is obviously interested in problems of the
administration of justice as they affect the common
weal, we cannot assume, in face of some of the
possible portents of Escobedo, that the Supreme
Court has accepted as a fact that post-arrest inquiry is more than an important tool of law enforcement and is, in fact, a necessity. Nor, of course,
can we be sure that the American Law Institute
will retain the provisions circumscribing and then
authorizing such inquiry. And it is always possible
that a state appellate court will lay down a rule
2
excluding all post-arrest confessions.
We who have been engaged in law enforcement
are certain that the right of inquiry is integral to
the continued effectiveness of much of our crime
detection effort. And since a pattern of crime detection deters crime, it is integral to much of our
crime prevention effort. The arguments can be
marshalled 6 But marshalling arguments is very
25

The Supreme Court may be the bellwether, but
often state courts outstrip it in progressing down the
road. I am sure that this can be documented by any
number of post-Mapp search and seizure cases. And can
we say, in the wake of Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315, that Escoledo went any further in its holding than
did the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Donovan,
26 13 N.Y. 2d 148, 193 N.E. 2d 628?
Nowhere, in my judgment, have the arguments
against proscription of voluntary post-arrest confessions
been as effectively marshalled as in the brief filed on
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different from, and much less effective than, marshalling evidence. We pay the penalty today for
too much polemics and too little research in the
past. It is not too late, however, for us to marshal
the evidence, gather the data, do the research
which will persuade the Supreme Court not to prohibit truly voluntary post-arrest confessionsevidence which will sustain the draftsmen of the
ALI tentative draft in retaining the provisions
authorizing post-arrest inquiry and which perhaps
will persuade them to broaden their scope; and
which will deter state courts from outstripping the
Supreme Court in placing restrictions on the admissibility of post-arrest confessions.
What sort of evidence should we gather; what
data should we compile? To those engaged in law
enforcement it seems self-evident that post-arrest
inquiry is essential to effective crime detection. We
postulate this judgment, however, on our past experience-experience with burglars arrested in the
act who are suspected of having committed a series
of other burglaries throughout the city, or within
a given area; with kidnappers whose colleagues still
hold the victim; with criminals who have stolen
property which has yet to be recovered; and with
solitary killers where the only witnesses to their
crimes, the victims, are dead.
Self-evident? Perhaps. But our judgment is predicated on a vast body of past experience, personal
or vicarious, and the data with respect to this experience can and should be assembled. Are there
cases where, save for post-arrest inquiry of the
defendant, the crimes would not have been solved?
Certainly there are. But we must assemble the
data. Are there cases where the failure to make
post-arrest inquiry would have required the release,
to prey again upon the public, of a compulsive
killer or rapist? There are. But where is the data?
Why has it not been made available to the Supreme
Court, to every state appellate court where the
admissibility of an incriminating post-arrest statement is at issue, and to those working on the ALI's
model code?
And the evidence and data need not, and indeed
should not, all be historical. In every police department in the land today we should be compiling
current, up-to-date information on the processes of
crime solution. We should, if possible, enlist the
assistance of objective outside researchers, perhaps
from universities or law schools, perhaps retained
by various foundations.
behalf of the United States by Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall in lWestover v. United States, subjvdice in

the Supreme Court.
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POsT-ARREST WARNINGS

It is not too late for us to gather empirical data
with respect to the necessity or the desirability of
warning arrestees of their right to remain silent,
and of their right to counsel. Should such warnings
be required? The prevailing opinon among municipal law enforcement officers seems to be that they
should not, because they will deter effective postarrest interrogation. But do we know this? The
special agents of the FBI generally give such warnings to those suspected of crime. Is the difference
between federal and municipal law enforcement,
and the crimes and criminals with which each is concerned, such that these warnings, particularly with
respect to right to counsel, will prevent meaningful
inquiry in the municipal context, when they do not
do so in the federal context? Or in federal law enforcement has the investigation in fact been completed when the arrest is made, so that post-arrest
inquiry is not a vital part of the investigation? If
this is so, the fact that warnings may actually be a
deterrent to effective inquiry is relatively unimportant in the federal context, and federal experience is irrelevant to municipal law enforcement
problems.
Municipal law enforcement officers know that
post-arrest inquiry is vital; the problem is to make
available to others the evidence and data upon
which that knowledge is grounded. With respect to
the deterrent influence of warnings upon the effectiveness of post-arrest inquiry, most municipal law
enforcement officers can make only a slightly informed guess, since they have rarely given such
warnings.
THE USEFULNESS OF PILOT PROJECTS

Here is a prime area for the development, on a
prospective basis through pilot projects, of empirical data. Why cannot every large police department institute pilot projects, in which simply the
warnings with respect to the right to remain silent
are given? Then in other areas the full panoply of
suggested warnings, including that of the right to
counsel, would be given. The rest of the city would
remain a control for comparison purposes. Comparison could also be made with past experience in
the pilot project areas. The information derived
from the pilot projects would be, in my judgment,
invaluable.
If the warnings substantially deter effective investigation of crime, and hence the due administration of justice, this information would be valuable
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to the Supreme Court and to all other non-law
enforcement groups considering the matter. Any
value judgment would then have to balance the
desirability of requiring the warnings against the
established impediment which such a requirement
would impose to the due administration of justice.
If, on the other hand, it develops that the warnings
do not materially impede effective post-arrest inquiry, then there will be no over-riding reason why
the warnings should not be given, and the way will
be clear to require them.
The areas for the pilot project studies I have
suggested will have to be carefully selected. They
must include various types of precincts, with
various social, economic, and ethnic compositions.
Police investigations tend to be most difficult in
those municipal areas where, for social, economic
or historic reasons, there is a hostility to the police.
Ironically, it is in those very areas that the public
most needs protection because it is against the residents of those areas that crime-violent crimetends to be most rampant. There is already, in such
areas, a reluctance, bred of hostility, to talk to
police. It is possible that warnings given in the
course of investigation will reinforce this reluctance
and make effective inquiry impossible. Such areas,
therefore, should be included in the pilot projects,
but the projects should not be confined to them.
TiE ImpoRTAN cE oF POST-AnnEST INQuIRY

Actually, the most critical threat posed to effective law enforcement today (and hence to the protection of society as a whole) is that of the proscription of post-arrest, pre-arraignment, inquiry. In my
judgment such inquiry should be permitted, and
the constitutional focus of the Supreme Court
should be upon whether or not, in light of all the
circumstances, the statements elicited from the defendant are voluntary. In determining whether or
not the statements are voluntary the Court must
consider, of course, all of the circumstances: where
the statement was made; who was present; if there
was interrogation how long it lasted and what was
its nature; whether or not the arraignment was
postponed to enable the interrogation to take place
or continue; the age, education, background, and
mental state of the defendant; the nature of the
alleged crime; the law enforcement exigencies, if
any, requiring extended interrogation, such as the
need to establish the whereabouts of the defendant's partners, or perhaps of his victim, or the
location of stolen property.
It is difficult to recreate for a court the pressures

under which the investigation of serious municipal
crime is carried out. The court, it seems to me,
tends to equate criminal investigation with the
preparation of a case for trial, but the analogy is
inapt. There are, at times, hectic activities in connection with the preparation of a case for trial, but
it generally involves the careful organization of
available pieces of evidence, with only an occassional scramble to secure a missing piece. Investigation of serious municipal crime, on the other
hand, is constant scramble: scramble to locate evidence, and missing witnesses, reluctant witnesses,
and perhaps unknowing witnesses; scramble to
verify statements, by door to door searches, laboratory analyses, and interviews with other witnesses; scramble to make and maintain order out
of a chaotic flow of information and misinformation; scramble to establish identification.
Arrest in municipal law enforcement-and in
striking contrast to the patterns of federal law enforcement-very often necessarily takes place at
the beginning rather than the end of an investigation; often before there has been identification of
the arrestee or even verification of the crime to be
charged. To proscribe post-arrest inquiry would in
many cases frustrate investigation. It might even
frustrate exoneration of the accused. By the time
the case reaches court the pieces have fallen neatly
into place, and the whole tale unfolds in an orderly
pattern, but the investigation itself is often chaotic.
In reviewing the propriety of action taken, this
atmosphere of constant flux, with the pressure it
places upon the police officers concerned, must not
be overlooked.
All this goes, too, to considering whether or not
the cut-off suggested by Mr. justice Goldberg is
appropriate as the touchstone for determining the
admissibility of a confession. When, one may ask,
does the investigation turn the comer, with respect
to the defendant, from the investigative to the
accusatory stage.n Who is to judge, in the chaos of
the station house, when that corner is turned?
Solicitor General Marshall pointed out, in the
brief filed on behalf of the Government in Westover v. United States, that the greatest need, in the
investigation of a criminal case, is "to hear a suspect's first explanation and then to screen his story
so as to make a prompt and proper disposition of
his case." In many cases, investigation which follows inquiry of an arrested suspect may establish
his innocence and this, as General Marshall has
noted, is certainly relevant in striking a balance
27 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964).
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between permissible and prohibited post-arrest inquiry. This inquiry may not establish innocence,
but may establish the appropriateness of a lesser
charge. It may also-and often does-provide the
only means of solving other crimes which the suspect committed, or of establishing the identity of
a suspect's colleagues. Therefore, in my judgment,
it would seriously deter effective law enforcement
if a rule were promulgated proscribing post-arrest
inquiry. Post-arrest statements should be admissible in evidence if, on consideration of all the circumstances, it is determined that they were voluntarily made.
CONCLUSION
The primary thrust of this paper has been to call
upon law enforcement agencies to clearly recognize
the subordinate role which law enforcement plays
in the democratic scheme. Law enforcement is not
an end but an instrument; and it is an instrument
of the people. The climate of law and social order
that law enforcement agencies are charged with
maintaining is not an end but a means; the end is
the availability to all of the opportunity to exercise
and enjoy their rights and liberties. Thus, it is encumbent upon municipal law enforcement agencies
so to order their activities that those activities
themselves do not violate those rights, and do not
unduly impinge upon those liberties.
It is important, at the same time, that law enforcement not be deterred from its task of maintaining law and social order, by restrictions which
may render it substantially less effective. Every
extension of newly enunciated rights into the area
of law enforcement activity has the potential for
seriously impeding law enforcement. Mr. Justice
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White drew attention to this problem in his Escobedo dissent when he said:
I do not suggest for a moment that law enforcement will be destroyed by the rule announced today. The need for peace and order
is too insistent for that. But it will be crippled
and its task made a great deal more difficult,
all in my opinion, for unsound, unstated reasons, which can find no home in any of the
provisions of the Constitution. 8
All law enforcement activities impinge, to some
extent, upon individual liberty. The justification
for this impingement is that the activities are necessary to insure individual liberties for all; only the
strong enjoy liberty in a chaotic society.
What we must strike, therefore, is a balance: how
much impingement by law enforcement will be
necessary in the corporate interest of society? Today I call upon law enforcement to play a constructive, rather than a substantially negative, role in
assisting to strike that balance. But I call also upon
those primarily concerned with the rights of the
individual to recognize the essential role which
effective law enforcement plays in endowing individual rights with significance, and I ask them to
pay close attention to the arguments which law
enforcement representatives make today, and to
the evidence and data they may submit to29

morrow.

378 U.S. 478, 499 (1964).
1 suggest, in this paper, various pilot projects on
the part of municipal law enforcement, and am subject
to the criticism that I did not initiate such projects
while I was Police Commissioner of the New York City
Police Department. I regret that I did not. Expansion
of the Manhattan Summons Project was, in my short
time in the Department, vigorously pursued, and, if I
had remained, pilot projects along the lines suggested
herein would also have been undertaken.
29

